Provincial Ombudsperson Jay Chalke has a hot potato in his lap. Like it or not, he is going to have to handle it. On Wednesday, an all-party sa国际传媒 legislature committee voted 5-4 to give him the job of investigating the Health Ministry firings. He didn鈥檛 want the task unless the committee met a list of conditions 鈥� and he probably didn鈥檛 want it under any circumstances.
However, he must accept the committee鈥檚 referral, so he will have to set aside his misgivings.
Chalke wanted unanimous backing from the members of the committee, as well as support from the seven fired drug researchers and the family of the eighth, who committed suicide. He didn鈥檛 get either.
The eight asked again for a public inquiry and said Chalke鈥檚 office doesn鈥檛 have sufficient independence to do a proper investigation.
The government says it has amended legislation and taken other steps to ensure the ombudsperson has the powers he needs to investigate how and why the eight researchers were fired. Some were rehired, others have settled their lawsuits and two suits are still before the courts. Roderick MacIsaac killed himself after he was fired.
The investigation presents some peculiar problems for Chalke and his staff that would not exist in a public inquiry.
In a public inquiry or a probe like the one that former civil servant Bob Plecas is doing into the Ministry of Child ren and Family Development, someone from outside the government would be appointed to conduct the investigation. In the case of a public inquiry, it would often be a retired judge or a lawyer, who is seen to be independent.
Such people know how to conduct proceedings that are judicial or semi-judicial. They know how to deal with a forum where the participants 鈥� whose livelihoods and reputations are on the line 鈥� are represented by lawyers.
The ombudsperson鈥檚 office is akin to a marriage counsellor, working things out by mediation. It helps citizens who have run afoul of the bureaucracy.
What the government has in mind is closer to a divorce proceeding, with the ombudsperson conducting the hearing and dividing the family assets. This probe, with the need to compel testimony, is going to be unlike anything Chalke or his predecessors have done in the past.
It puts him and his staff in an uncomfortable position. Although he is an independent officer of the legislature, he is seen by the public as part of 鈥済overnment,鈥� and his staff have a collegial relationship with civil servants.
Many came from the civil service and might be interested in returning. Being part of a public roasting of senior public servants could be a career-limiting exercise.
Given those circumstances, Chalke and his staff face a lose-lose situation. If their report goes too easy on the civil servants, it will be seen as a whitewash. If it is too harsh, it could derail their own careers.
The government hopes that by referring the case to the ombudsperson, it can get a quicker, cheaper result than it would get from a public inquiry 鈥� something like what it hopes for from the Plecas investigation.
However, it is possible to set up something between the two extremes.
The law gives the government wide latitude in establishing a public inquiry, in terms of scope and power to compel testimony. It could use that latitude to create something between the Plecas inquiry and the three-ring circus of a traditional public inquiry.
The ombudsperson鈥檚 office is not well-suited to doing the investigation, and handing Chalke this hot potato might not yield the clear resolution the government and the public want.
