Today is the 99th anniversary of the close of the First World War. It was supposed to be the war to end all wars, but of course that鈥檚 not what happened.
Today, as it appears we are nearing a climax in the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S., it might be worth considering the similarities between these two quagmires.
In explaining his country鈥檚 decision to enter the First World War, a German politician of the time had this to say: 鈥淏etter a terrible end than a terror without end.鈥�
The spectre of that mindset, which led to the deaths of 18 million men, women and children, is still with us. As North Korea builds atomic weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, there are some who believe it better to risk a nuclear war now than live with the threat.
The leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, appears to be one such man. So, in some of his fierier rhetoric, does U.S. President Donald Trump.
And the parallels, a century later, don鈥檛 end there. Today, North Korea taunts the West because a more powerful neighbour 鈥� China 鈥� stands behind it. Likewise, Austria, in the days preceding the First World War, attacked Serbia because it had the backing of the potent German war machine.
In turn, Germany鈥檚 leader 鈥� Kaiser Wilhelm II 鈥� was a sabre-rattling buffoon given to outlandish public statements. Trump comes to mind.
But what should concern us most, as the crisis on the Korean Peninsula deepens, is the possibility that things might get out of control. In 1914, as now, no sane person wished a conflagration. And yet that is what occurred.
Entangled alliances were part of it. For reasons of blood and honour, Germany was determined to stand by Austria, come what may. On the opposing side, Russia felt obliged to back Serbia to the hilt.
Today, America is committed to protecting South Korea, a country it fought a war to defend. On the opposing side, China cannot countenance the defeat of North Korea, as that might result in the installation of a U.S. client state.
The danger is that complexity might become the enemy of sanity. What matters today is not what the opposing sides in the Korean crisis want. It is whether their leaders can navigate a system of interlocking commitments that confounded the diplomats of an earlier era.
The need to save face is also a factor, as it was in 1914.
Today, China is making aggressive moves toward its neighbours, with the apparent intent of intimidating them. The U.S., similarly, has global interests to protect. Neither can afford to be humiliated.
It might be felt the threat of a nuclear war would be enough to force a peaceful resolution.
But here a new complication arises. North Korea鈥檚 leaders might hesitate to attack the U.S., yet they could sell some of their nuclear arsenal to terrorist organizations. Alternatively, they could offer assistance to countries with nuclear aspirations, such as Iran or Syria.
Can the U.S., or any other western country, afford to live with such a threat?
In short, as was the case in 1914, the stakes are enormous and the diplomatic complexities formidable.
On the eve of the First World War, the leaders of Germany, Russia, France and Britain, realizing their predicament, tried to halt the runaway train. But they had left it too late.
Whether we have reached that point in the Korean confrontation is uncertain. Yet the lesson is clear.
Wait too long to find a solution, and events might take their own course.
