The Vancouver Island Health Authority鈥檚 announcement of the return of fixed-site needle-exchange services (鈥渟ervice hubs鈥�) to Victoria, after five years of false starts and delays, raises some important questions.
Why is VIHA taking so long to reintroduce this basic harm-reduction service? Can Victoria residents be confident we won鈥檛 see similar implementation failures when it comes to other components of health policy, such as supervised consumption services or drug and alcohol maintenance programs?
Five years is a long time for a health authority to fail to provide services mandated by the province.
As early as 2009, a VIHA briefing note to the board of directors pointed out that 鈥渨ithout a fixed site NEX [needle exchange] the health authority is not consistent with either its own or with provincial policy,鈥� and acknowledged that 鈥渇ailing to establish a fixed site NEX as part of a distributed harm-reduction model puts the health authority at risk for spread of HIV, hepatitis C and other blood-borne diseases.鈥�
Five years is also a long time to wait for a basic health service, particularly for people who lack the financial resources to find support elsewhere. When it comes to fixed-site needle-exchange services, it鈥檚 not just access to clean supplies, but access to health care and referrals for people who would not otherwise have contact with these services.
So these five years can be measured, not only in terms of infections and diseases that could have been prevented, but also in terms of improvements to people鈥檚 health and well-being that could have been provided and encouraged.
Policy implementation sometimes moves slowly, but there are reasonable grounds to question whether VIHA has exercised due diligence in implementing these services in a timely and appropriate manner.
A scant two months following the policy brief above, VIHA disbanded its needle-exchange advisory committee and stopped speaking publicly about needle-exchange services, making an abrupt shift toward a 鈥渄istributed model鈥� of supplying needles through existing service-providers.
In a letter to VIHA dated Nov. 19, 2009, the advisory committee expressed its concern about a policy it believed 鈥渉amper[ed] the successful search for a needle exchange site鈥� and re-stated VIHA鈥檚 own findings that a distributed model could not replace the range of services provide by a fixed site.
On what grounds were decisions to disband the needle-exchange advisory committee and to shift toward a distributed model made? This remains unclear.
More than a year later, the City of Victoria passed motions urging VIHA to form a working group to ensure fixed-site needle-exchange services would be reintroduced. In a letter dated March 4, 2011, VIHA agreed to form such a group as long as there was agreement 鈥渂etween the city, the police and VIHA on the benefits of harm-reduction services based on best practices, including the reduction of public consumption of drugs and improving public order.鈥�
Why was the city forced to prompt the provision of services VIHA recognizes as part of its provincial health mandate? What considerations led VIHA to prioritize public order and other policing issues as conditions for meeting this mandate? This also remains unclear.
The reintroduction of fixed-site needle exchanges is an important step forward for health services in Victoria. There are reasonable grounds to be concerned, though, about VIHA鈥檚 track record on implementing such services. What changes are needed to prevent similar implementation failures when it comes to other components of health policy, such as supervised consumption services or drug and alcohol maintenance programs?
It is in the public interest to hold VIHA accountable in addressing these concerns. Effective implementation of public-health policy requires an assessment of past mistakes, and we haven鈥檛 seen this yet at VIHA.
Mark Willson is a PhD candidate in political science, researching VIHA鈥檚 institutional effectiveness using freedom-of-information requests.
