The Edward Snowden affair can鈥檛 help but conjure memories of the Cold War ideological struggle between Russia and the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 willingness to thumb his nose at U.S. President Barack Obama by granting whistleblower Snowden asylum smacks of the tit-for-tat retaliations that once characterized American relations with the Soviet Union.
But that鈥檚 where the Cold War comparison stops. The Snowden decision reflects 鈥� and is a response to 鈥� Russia鈥檚 resentment over its post-Cold War status.
After the implosion of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s, Russia spiralled downward. With the economy collapsing, the navy rusted out, the air force was practically grounded and even army soldiers had difficulty getting ammunition. Russia鈥檚 borders shrivelled to their 17th-century configuration as countries such as Latvia, Hungary and Ukraine slipped free of the imperial grip. Some joined NATO, making Russia鈥檚 humiliation even more acute.
And then came Putin. The Russian president鈥檚 intentions were obvious 鈥� the restoration of Russia as a great power holding sway, if not outright domination, over its old Soviet-era empire. Analyst Leon Aron describes the Putin Doctrine in the March edition of Foreign Affairs: 鈥淎fter his election as president in 2000, Putin added to his agenda an overarching goal: The recovery of economic, political and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state in 1991.鈥�
Over the last 10 years, oil and gas revenues have allowed Putin to pump billions into military rearmament, and, in the international arena, reassert Russian interests.
Putin obviously doesn鈥檛 give a toss about western opinions, particularly when he gets what he wants regardless of the West鈥檚 rhetorical outrage. It also helps that the Russian economy is in reasonable health. According to the World Bank, despite recent signs of weakness, the country enjoys a balanced budget, a public debt of 10 per cent of the gross domestic product, and the lowest unemployment in 20 years. While the eurozone remains in recession and the U.S. economy sputters, the Russian economy 鈥渓ooks strong,鈥� the bank concludes.
The economy鈥檚 strength allows Putin to spend billions on rearmament, acquiring everything from nuclear submarines and warships (24 subs and 54 surface ships by 2020) to warplanes and ICBMs. This rearmament reflects both Putin鈥檚 attempt to restore Russian prestige, but also geostrategic concerns. To the east, China builds up its military, raising the prospect that some day the Chinese might lay claim to the underpopulated regions of Siberia and all its natural resources. To the south, the upheaval in the Middle East highlights the Islamist threat to Russia鈥檚 southern flank. And, gazing west, NATO has encroached.
In responding to some of these concerns, Putin has taken advantage of perceived American weakness. Burdened by debt and a weak economy, the U.S. could be forced to reduce its military reach even as it 鈥減ivots鈥� its geostrategic focus toward Asia. What better time for Russia to assert itself without fear of a serious response? Besides, Putin regards Obama as weak and naive.
It鈥檚 not an unwarranted judgment. Obama came into office wanting to 鈥渞eset鈥� U.S.-Russian relations, seeking closer co-operation on terrorism issues, Iran and the Middle East. In March, the U.S. unilaterally announced it was cancelling the final stage of its European missile-defence program. Was the Russian president grateful? The decision to grant Snowden asylum suggests not.
The Snowden affair might seem trivial in itself, but it shows Putin has no fear Obama will retaliate in any significant manner. Obama鈥檚 decision to cancel a one-on-one meeting with Putin is no punishment; the Russian leader has already got what he wants from Obama 鈥� retreat on missile defence, stalemate on Syria and nothing but rhetoric on human rights. (Would cancelling U.S. participation in the Sochi Olympics next year be a substantive response?)
The competition between Russia and the U.S. for ideological supremacy may be over, but the Great Game continues as it is always has with the strongman taking advantage of a weakened opponent.
听
Robert Sibley writes for the Ottawa Citizen.
